



Special Issue. The Role of Institutions and Governance in Sport
European Journal of Government and Economics 9(2), July 2020. 




Number 9, issue 2, June 2020 





How the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations affect to football clubs’ priorities 
and leagues’ competitive balance? 119-142 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5842 
Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio and Giambattista Rossi 
 
 
Surveys assessing sports services and municipal governance 143-154 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5949   
Júlia Bosch, Laureà Fanega, Jaume García, Núria Hernández, Xavier Moya,  
and Carles Murillo 
 
 
Evaluation of the perceived social impacts of the Formula E Grand Prix 
of Santiago de Chile  155-169 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5850 
David Parra-Camacho, Daniel Michel Duclos Bastías, Frano Giakoni Ramírez,  
and Samuel López-Carril 
 
 
Comparative analysis of income trends and perceived value of squad 
of the highest turnover European football clubs (2010-2019) 170-180 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5953    
Benito Pérez-González, Luis de la Riva, José Bonal, and Álvaro Fernández-Luna 
 
 
Analysis of loyalty and future intentions of the users of the golf courses 
in Andalusia, Spain 181-199 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5841  
Marcos Pradas García, María José Maciá Andreu, Marta García-Tascón,  
and Ana María Gallardo Guerrero 
 
 
Female leadership in sports clubs 200-209 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5840  
Alfonso Martínez-Moreno, Francisco Cavas-García, Francisco Cano-Noguera,  
and Arturo Díaz-Suárez 
 
 
The profile of leisure time sports people and their reason for doing sport  
in Spanish sports facilities  210-219 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2020.9.2.5846   
Moisés Grimaldi-Puyana, Pablo Gálvez-Ruiz, Manel Valcarce-Torrente, 












Comparative analysis of income trends and perceived value of squad 
of the highest turnover European football clubs (2010-2019) 
Benito Pérez-González a*, Luis de la Riva b, José Bonal b, Álvaro Fernández-Luna b 
a Universidad Isabel I, Spain 
b Universidad Europea de Madrid, Spain 
* Corresponding author at: benitoperezgonzalez@gmail.com 
 
Article history. Received 15 January 2020; first revision required 17 March 2020; accepted 25 May 2020. 
 
 
Abstract. The purpose was to analyse the income variation of the 13 top clubs of Deloitte Football Money League 
Report (2019) as well as the variation of the perceived value of their squad, obtained from the website 
www.transfermarkt.es during 9 seasons. Friedman's two-way analysis by ranges of selected samples and Wilcoxon W 
tests were used to measure the evolution and relation among the clubs’ income and perceived value of players. The 
income of clubs was deflected according to inflation (CPI: 2016) and market value was adjusted to a 20 players squad. 
Market value and income have a significant positive variation from one year to the next (p = .000). We found differences 
between both variables only in the last 2 years on the period analysed (2011-2019). Market value has suffered an 
increase higher than expected. This fact should make football managers reflect on how to control constant inflation in 
the transfer market. 
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1. Introduction  
In recent years there has been an increase in the income of the main European football clubs 
(Deloitte, 2019; Solberg, 2016), and also an increase in the market value of footballers, 
confirmed by the extensive bibliography that links both variables (Kuper and Szymanski, 2014; 
Rodríguez, 2012; Sánchez, Barajas, and Sánchez-Fernández, 2019). In the literature there are 
also multiple confirmations of the relationship between income and results (Hall, Szymanski, 
and Zimbalist, 2002;   Pawlowski, Breuer, and Hovemann, 2010; Plumley, Ramchandani and 
Wilson,  2019). However, there are other factors, aside from the economic ones, that play a role 
when it comes to obtaining a highly valued team, among which is the capacity of its manager or 
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2. Literature review 
Transfer Market 
Sport is, in many ways, a perfect laboratory to try to obtain intuitions about the way in which 
humans make decisions (Palacios-Huerta, 2019). One of the biggest concerns of managers and 
coaches is to get the best possible staff for their club; but these are subject to numerous biases 
(Varela-Quintana and Del Corral, 2019) that can influence the decisions they make when 
putting together their teams. Bias such as projection bias or over inference can make you 
decide to buy a player for a price higher than its value. Another fundamental factor when 
making signings is the situation of “Dominance or distress” (Szymanski, 2019) in which the club 
is at that time. Clubs that have achieved their goals or that have been close to doing so have 
less pressure than those who did not. Losers are subjected to the double urgency of having to 
make changes and the knowledge that exists in the market of that situation, which usually leads 
inexorably to the assumption of cost overruns. Some types of player overvaluation have been 
described in the literature: for example, the overvaluation of players of some nationalities, the 
possible overvaluation of mature players, the overvaluation of players when they respond to 
some important need in any of the lines of a club or should replace a notorious exit (Kuper and 
Szymanski, 2014). In the sense of the latter bias, Palacios-Huerta (2019) highlights that the best 
players, those with some distinctive factor, are usually overrated. 
Another important aspect in the transfer market movement is the taxation and salaries of the 
players (Palacios-Huerta, 2019). Some countries and certain clubs offer economic incentives 
that are very attractive to football players. Being the best offer from a sporting point of view is no 
longer a guarantee to attract talent. In the literature and in practice, different measures have 
been studied and applied to improve the competitive balance of competitions (Késenne, 2015, 
2019): the salary gap - not used in Europe - or the reservation clause are some of these options 
to restrict the mobility of players. 
Simmons and Berri (2019) mention that Szymanski (2015) argued that the transfer market 
should not exist, since it restricts workers’ free mobility, enabling owners to withhold most of the 
capital gain. According to him, if big clubs exchange players with each other using large transfer 
fees, an uneven and uncompetitive Market will emerge. Other authors advocate the existence of 
the transfer market, since they believe that the payment of the transfer compensates for the loss 
of a valuable asset (Terviö, 2010). 
The last factor that is affecting the football market is the club’s academies management. 
Successful football clubs are increasingly placing value on their youth academies. In many 
cases, clubs own facilities that accommodate several youth teams, including those with children 
who are under 10 years old. Clubs in which many youth academy players make it to the first 
team save large amounts of money that they would otherwise invest in signing players. An 
illustrative example of this situation is Club Atlético de Madrid, which has managed to be in the 
Top 5 of the most valuable squads despite earning less than one third of the revenue of its 
direct competitors (Pérez-González, 2017). 
Finally, sometimes it is very difficult to know the real market value of a player or his real 
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transfer fee. Therefore we must highlight the role of The Transfermarkt website 
(www.transfermarkt.de). Transfermarkt is a German-Based website and the leading website on 
the football transfer market. The site offers, within other general football-related data, the 
estimations of market value at the individual and team levels for most professional football 
leagues, based on the judgement of fans (Müller, Simons and Weinmann, 2017). This source 
has also been used in recent scientific studies (Peeters, 2018) as providing reliable game 
performance indicators and has been described as a good predictor of real market values 
(Herm, Callsen-Bracker, and Kreis, 2014). However, there are some controversial aspects that 
could affect directly to the perceived (and real) market value of players. On the one hand, the 
main issue is the lack of knowledge and experience, as well as the impulsive behaviour of some 
registered users (Lorenz et al., 2011), and on the other hand, possible attempts at manipulation 
by agents in lower categories such second division. 
 
Football Clubs’ Income Sources 
The income of football clubs can be divided into 3 main channels, following the classification 
proposed by Deloitte: Commercial, Broadcasting and Match Day. 
Below we show the evolution that the different types of income have had over the last 10 




Figure 1. 10-year evolution of the percentage of income of the 13 clubs with the highest profits in the 
Deloitte Football Money League 2019. Source: Own elaboration, Deloitte data (2010-2019). 
 
Only a couple of decades ago, more than 80% of revenues came from Match Day, mainly 
ticketing revenues, since the exploitation of stadiums for other uses was very residual. For this 
reason, Santiago Bernabéu decided to build a stadium with 100,000 spectators (Sánchez et al., 
2019). Today, ticketing has ceased to be the main entrance of funds in the main clubs, but the 
German stadiums for the 2006 World Cup or the inauguration of the Emirates Stadium of 
Arsenal in that same year, served as an example for many clubs to make significant 
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income through the Naming Rights or the exploitation of their facilities both in Match Day and in 
other uses: catering, congresses, shopping centers, hotels, etc. The Wanda Metropolitano of 
the Atlético de Madrid, released in 2017, or the expensive remodeling projects of the Santiago 
Bernabéu (Real Madrid CF) and Nou Camp (FC Barcelona) stadiums are good examples of 
this. 
But the Match Day, as important as it is, represents an increasingly lower percentage of club 
revenues, which are increasingly coming from broadcasting and commercial. Television 
broadcasting rights have grown dramatically in the last decade in all major football leagues. For 
their part, the big clubs are constantly looking for new markets and followers to improve their 
income through sponsors, merchandising, tours, etc. TV rights are centralized in the major 
European leagues, including the Spanish football league. This league chose the centralized 
option in 2015, in spite of the reluctance of Real Madrid and Barcelona, the two biggest Spanish 
clubs. Centralization has promoted revenue growth in all clubs, and it has also reduced the gap 
between the small and big football clubs, since small clubs can now access the transfer market 
with a larger budget. 
To this end, Real Madrid has been working side by side with the American technology giant 
Microsoft, whose mission was from the beginning to undertake a "digital transformation", to 
place fans at the epicenter of all the club's activity, enabling them to participate in it. The 
objective is to generate income in this way. Real Madrid is not just a sports club. It is a gigantic 
means of communication, but not only sports, also entertainment, and a huge social platform. 
The rise of annual revenue in the main European football leagues seems to indicate that this 
is a sector benefited by globalization, which has emerged as a result of new communications 
technology (García del Barrio and Tena Horrillo, 2019). The importance of media visibility and 
fan pressure in the purchase of players represent factors that promote price increases in the 
transfer market. 
In spite of the weak competitiveness of European football leagues (causing strong 
imbalances), revenues have not stopped growing over the last years (Fort, 2019). Different 
studies show that European football clubs aim to maximize victories, not profits. Lago, Simmons 
and Szymanski (2006) and also García del Barrio and Szymanski (2009) showed that there was 
a clear quest for the maximization of victories in leagues such as the Spanish and the British 
league. More recently, Fort (2019) argues that the pressure to achieve victories is much higher 
in Europe than in the USA, in line with other cited studies. In addition, other researchers claim 
that the pressure to achieve wins is contrary to a management policy focusing on long-term 
performance (Buraimo et al., 2015). These facts explain the strong proclivity of European clubs 
to reinvest their profit in purchasing talented players, which affects prices. The law of 
diminishing returns shows that there is a threshold in which the marginal performance of each 
new unit of talent will not provide a new unit of utility. Media visibility is strongly correlated with 
the sporting talent of the club.   
But not everything has been revenue growth. The expenses of the clubs have grown linearly 
and many of them have been in economic difficulties for various reasons such as 
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mismanagement, the dizzying increase in the wage bill, the cost of staff renewal or the 
purchase of certain football clubs for tycoons or states. For all these reasons, some 
international organizations, such as FIFA, have proposed account control mechanisms, seeking 
sustainable income and that comes exclusively from the football business (Mareque, Barajas, 
and López-Corrales, 2018; Sánchez et al., 2019). 
Finally, the pyramidal system of promotions and relegations used in European leagues 
(Szymanski, 2019) is another strong impediment for the maximization of profit. On the other 
hand, the American league system, which does not rely on promotions and relegations, facilitate 
agreements between clubs to maximize their profits. 
Thus, based on the growing and changing economic situation of European football clubs and 
the importance of the testing of crowds in the players’ market value, this research aimed to 
analyse the income variation of the 13 top football clubs in the ranking of the last Deloitte 
Football Money League Report (2019) during the last 9 seasons, as well as the variation of the 





Transfermarkt (www.transfermarkt.com) is the leading website of the football transfer market. 
The site offers, within other general football-related data, the estimations of market value at the 
individual and team levels for most professional football leagues (Müller, Simons, and 
Weinmann, 2017). The web, which establishes the market value of players based on registered 
users, has been used in other recent research (Peeters, 2018) as a reliable indicator related to 
game performance (Herm, Callsen-Bracker, and Kreis, 2014) and as a good predictor of the 
real value of players  (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007). On the other hand, Deloitte Football Money 
League Report, published just eight months after the end of the 2017/18 season, is the most 
contemporary and reliable independent analysis of the clubs’ relative financial performance 
(Deloitte, 2019) and its objective is to profile the highest revenue generating clubs in the world 
of football. 
For our study, which analyses the income and the value of players of the last 9 seasons, we 
have consulted the Deloitte Football Money League Reports from 2011 to 2019. Otherwise, 
Transfermarkt holds information about the value of football players for the last 9 years. 
 
Table 1. Total Data of Income and Perceived Market Value used in the study. 
 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 Total Data obtained 
Total Data of Value 
Players obtained from 
Transfermarkt 
 
307 316 314 298 305 295 296 296 313 3.812 
Total Data of Income 
obtained from Deloitte 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 117 




The evolution of the income obtained from The Deloitte Football Money League Reports and the 
value of the squad (consulted on February 2019) of the 13 selected clubs was analysed, using 
Friedman's two-way analysis by ranges of selected samples. The income of clubs was deflected 
according to inflation (CPI: 2016).  To study the relationship between the two types of variables, 
in the section of the 9 years of study, Wicolxon W was applied for related samples. For both 
tests, p <0.05 was considered statistically significant. 
4. Results 
In table 2 we show the average value of the players, of each of the 13 teams analysed, 
throughout the 9 seasons object of our study. As indicated previously, these data have been 
obtained in Transfermarkt and are deflated to inflation (CPI: 2016). 
 
Table 2. Average Value of Player by Club and Season (M€)a. 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Real Madrid CF 22,3 24,6 25,2 23,8 29,9 36,8 37,7 49,1 41,3 
FC Barcelona 26,8 29,8 24,6 25,6 27,0 28,4 34,7 48,9 49,5 
Manchester United 14,7 15,1 17,9 19,8 17,1 17,1 20,4 30,8 30,3 
Bayern München 13,5 16,4 17,8 22,6 25,0 26,0 29,5 36,4 30,4 
Manchester City 15,5 18,9 19,9 20,9 20,7 21,9 23,0 41,6 45,9 
Paris Saint-Germain 5,3 10,1 13,0 17,9 19,5 19,1 17,9 34,7 34,5 
Liverpool FC 16,4 10,9 11,5 12,7 12,1 13,5 15,6 22,5 39,3 
Chelsea FC 21,2 19,3 15,3 20,6 22,6 23,3 20,3 34,6 35,1 
Arsenal FC 13,8 11,0 11,2 13,8 15,8 15,9 18,4 23,2 25,1 
Tottenham Hotspur  11,5 11,3 12,8 12,2 11,8 11,4 16,2 30,8 34,0 
Juventus 11,5 10,9 11,6 15,3 15,8 16,2 16,7 26,4 33,8 
Borussia Dortmund 5,6 7,4 10,8 13,7 13,8 14,5 12,2 15,4 22,7 
Atlético de Madrid 9,4 8,1 8,7 10,7 13,2 14,9 19,6 33,8 40,2 
a: Deflected according to inflation (CPI: 2016). 
 
On the other hand, in table 3 we show the income of each of the last 9 seasons of the 13 
clubs. As indicated, the data have been obtained in the Deloitte Football Money League Reports 
of each season and are deflated to inflation (CPI: 2016). 
 
Table 3. Income by Club and Season (M€)a. 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Real Madrid CF 482,5 516,9 538,2 543,8 583,6 613,7 641,2 693,5 764,4 
FC Barcelona 437,9 485,9 507,2 505,8 514,6 597,3 641,3 666,5 702,8 
Manchester United 384,8 395,6 415,7 444,1 550,1 553,3 712,4 695,2 678,0 
Bayern München 355,3 346,5 386,8 451,9 517,7 504,8 612,1 604,3 640,5 
Manchester City 168,1 182,8 299,9 331,4 440,1 493,6 542,7 542,5 578,6 
Paris Saint-Germain 90,2 107,8 231,5 417,9 503,6 512,1 538,6 499,8 551,5 
Liverpool FC 247,8 219,2 244,9 252,1 324,9 417,3 417,5 436,1 522,9 
Chelsea FC 281,5 269,3 338,7 318,0 411,9 447,3 462,6 440,0 514,8 
Arsenal FC 301,5 270,7 304,8 297,9 381,6 463,8 484,4 501,3 447,1 
Tottenham Hotspur  160,9 195,1 187,1 180,3 229,2 274,2 289,2 365,6 436,0 
Juventus 225,5 165,9 205,2 285,5 296,7 345,0 352,7 417,1 402,0 
Borussia Dortmund 115,7 149,3 198,6 268,5 277,7 298,8 293,6 341,9 322,9 
Atlético de Madrid 137,0 107,8 113,3 125,8 180,4 199,3 236,4 280,1 309,9 
a: Deflected according to inflation (CPI: 2016). 




First, applying Friedman's two-way analysis by ranges of related samples confirms, as we 
assumed, that both market value and revenue have a significant positive variation from one 
year to the next (p = .000).  Applying the W of Wicolxon for related samples (table 4), we verify 
that there are no differences in the average income and market value adjusted to 20 players in 
the first 7 years. However, in the last two years, there are significant differences, with a negative 
sign. That is, the workforce values are not related to income. 
 
Table 4. Average Value and Wilcoxon test of Clubs’ Revenue and Squad (20 players) Perceived Market 
Value. 
 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Average Revenue 
S/Deloitte (M€)a 259,2 261,1 303,8 338,3 398,7 437,5 476,1 496,3 519,2 
Average Perceived 
Market value of the 
squad (M€)a 
14,3 14,8 15,3 17,6 18,9 19,7 21,5 32,4 34,7 
Z -1,153b -1,433b -,035b -1,083b -,454c -1,642c -1,363c -2,551b -2,970b 
p value ,249 ,152 ,972 ,279 ,650 ,101 ,173 ,011* ,003* 
a: Deflected according to inflation (CPI: 2016). 
b: Based on positive ranges. 
c: Based on negative ranges. 
 
In figures 2 and 3, we can observe the evolution of clubs’ revenue and perceived market 
value respectively, and how there is a clear growing trend in all clubs, highlighting the scenario 





Figure 2. Evolution of club’s revenue during 9 seasons (2011-2019) (M€). 
 
 




Figure 3. Evolution of perceived market value during 9 seasons (2011-2019) (M€). 
 
5. Conclusions 
There has been a statistically significant increase, both in club revenues - they have grown 
100.3% in constant € in 9 years - and in the market value of players - the average value of 
players has grown 97, 1% in this period. 
For a few years, revenue growth and staff valuation had a statistical relationship, as 
expected. However, in the last two seasons we did not find a statistical relationship between 
income and staff value, something that could be explained by the large price escalation in the 
market, with cases as significant as the PSG signings, for € 222 and 188 million of Neymar and 
Mbappé, in the summer of 2017, which has caused an anchoring effect on the price of the costs 
of the players from that moment. It has also contributed to this lack of relationship between 
income and value of players the significant revaluation of the Atlético de Madrid squad, well 
above the growth of their income, being in the last 5 years the Club with greater efficiency 
(Pérez-González, 2017) of European football. However, Sánchez, Barajas and Sánchez 
Fernández (2019) showed a clear increase in the percentage of expenditure in salaries over the 
club’s turnover, especially at France Ligue 1, up to 2017 season.  This authors also argued 
about the real and efficient application of the Financial Fair Play, consisted on the regulation 
that controls the economic wealth, salaries and transfers in FIFA and its governing bodies. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear association between players’ salaries and transfers fees (Kuper 
and Szymanski, 2014). Thus, to our knowledge, this is the first study that makes a relation 
between perceived market value and top clubs’ income for a long timeframe. 
Our results suggest that it is becoming necessary that the leaders and decision-makers in 
the clubs take into account the assessment biases to avoid incurring them, being especially to 
find the optimal moment to make buying and selling decisions in the market; and think about the 
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improvement of their academies. However, more analysis about transfer market values and 
club’s income are needed in the coming years to check in the future that the differences 
identified in this study period remain in time. This paper shows a very incipient analysis, and 
only provides initial evidence of a possible pattern in future football.  
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